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Abstract 
 
Utilitarian foundations for limited government are shaky insofar as they assume rational and 
consistent individuals. Recently economists’ assumption of rational actors has come under sustained 
attack. Behavioural economics has suggested that people are plagued by irrational biases and 
inconsistencies. The author elucidates how these developments have led to a post-utilitarianism 
which is held to justify  paternalistic interventions by the state via ‘sin taxes’ , direct bans or new 
obligations. Individual responsibility is seriously undermined, as is faith in markets. He concludes that 
supporters of individual freedom need to move away from utilitarian reasoning, reassert core values 
of autonomy and responsibility, and define strict limits on the scope of government intervention.  
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Introduction 
 
Government regulation of private behaviour is increasingly accepted. The mayor of  New York 
recently proposed a ban on the serving of super-sized sodas as part of a crusade against the obesity 
‘crisis’. In the French news, this was presented without even a hint of criticism. An ‘expert’ was 
interviewed, and explained to us that this policy was a good idea because it may work. Nobody 
worried about constitutionally protected freedoms, or asked why a mayor could violate such 
freedoms at his own discretion. 
There are countless examples of such regulations1. New ones are introduced every day. Invariably, 
they are supported by a study which claims that the regulation will have a desirable effect on some 
key statistical indicator. No other questions asked, in particular questions such as these: 
• Why is obesity a “crisis”? 
• Why are sodas (which were introduced more than a century ago) responsible for today’s 
obesity, rather than the obese people themselves? 
• Why is it the job of the government to curb obesity, in particular by implementing coercive 
measures which constrain everybody, regardless of whether they are obese? 
 
Traditional liberal thought from Locke to Mill gives simple answers to these questions. There is no 
reason to object to obesity as long as it is the outcome of conscious personal choice. That some 
people dislike it is no justification for government intervention that would violate people’s natural 
rights. And finally, overweight people can only blame their own past choices for the adverse 
consequences that they face, not the availability of sodas and sweets that they could have chosen to 
avoid.  
 
The unopposed rise of paternalistic policies such as the New York mayor’s proposal suggests that we 
now live in a different paradigm from that of traditional liberals. As I argue at length in my book The 
tyranny of utility (Saint-Paul 2011), the new paternalistic state finds its intellectual underpinnings in 
recent developments in economics and other social sciences that provide justifications for far greater 
government intervention than before.  
 
While economic science traditionally provided support for free individual choice and free markets, 
this is no longer the case as  developments in the new area of behavioural economics undermine the 
philosophical and theoretical foundations of such support, and instead are used to justify the 
increasingly intrusive policies that are being implemented today.  
 
 
 
Behavioural economics and post-utilitarianism 
 
 
                                                          
1 Many examples are discussed in David Harsanyi’s book Nanny State (Harsanyi 2007) 
The economist’s notion of the common good has historically been  grounded in utilitarianism. This 
means that the welfare of ‘society’ is defined as the sum of  the welfare (also called utility) of its 
individuals. Why does this view lead to the presumption that individual freedom is desirable? 
Because economics also assumes that individuals are unitary – that is, made of a single self which is 
endowed with consistent preferences – and rationally pursue their own interest. Under such an 
assumption, people choose what is best for themselves among the set of available alternatives: this 
is called the revealed preference principle. Constraining their choices makes them worse off, and 
cannot generally improve the welfare of society, since this is the sum of individual welfare, unless 
somebody else is made better off by a larger amount. This may be the case when we redistribute 
from rich to poor, since it may be that the increase in the welfare of the poor exceeds the reduction 
in the welfare of the rich, from society’s standpoint. But it cannot be the case if we prevent 
somebody from drinking a soda, since it reduces his welfare as well as that of the owners of the soda 
producing firm.  
 
Yet economists now routinely advocate policies that restrict individual behavior, such as ‘sin taxes’ 
on smoking, gambling or eating,  or the requirement to participate in compulsory savings scheme 
such as public pensions. Their growing support for paternalism is the consequence of having 
abandoned utilitarianism. It could be, in principle, that ‘society’ wants people to be in better health 
than the individuals themselves appear to do, in which case the government is not maximizing the 
sum of individual utilities but instead pursuing some higher ideal (not unlike the partisans of eugenics 
in the  not-so-distant past). Economists may remain nominally utilitarian but they are gradually 
abandoning the conception of the individual as unitary and rational, implying that the revealed 
preference principle no longer applies. And they do so on the basis of evidence accumulated by 
psychologists, neuroscientists and others regarding biases in human behavior. These biases come in a 
variety of forms. 
 
For example, standard theory says that people should use all available information in order to make 
their best possible inference about the parameters that are relevant for their decisions. But it has 
been observed that people often process information so as to validate their past choices, that is, they 
give less weight to, or even ignore, signals which reveal that such choices might have been 
erroneous. That phenomenon is called cognitive dissonance. 2 Another form of cognitive dissonance 
is the ‘availability bias’, by which people tend to give excessive weight to their own experience. Thus 
people who were mugged in a particular neighborhood will infer that it is generally a dangerous area, 
whereas those who were not attacked will believe that this very same neighborhood is quite safe.  
Other biases suggest that the individual may be thought of as consisting of multiple selves, rather 
than a unique and consistent one. Brain scientists have shown that different mental processes – 
conscious and unconscious - compete in order to control the actions of the individual. Some of these 
processes are ‘cognitive’, i.e. driven by reason and others ‘affective’, i.e. driven by emotions and 
instincts3. Therefore, different actions undertaken by the same individual are in fact driven by 
                                                          
2 As an illustration, Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) performed an experiment where a group of students is asked 
to read the same studies about the effects of death penalty. They show that the subjects’ prior opinions are 
reinforced after reading these studies, regardless of whether those opinions were favourable or not.  
 
3 See Camerer et  al.  (2005), Berridge (1996) and Ross et al. (1995). 
different mental processes. This means they are not mutually consistent and can be interpreted as 
being chosen by competing selves, or incarnations of the individual.  
The ‘multiple selves’ model may be particularly relevant with respect to the individual’s 
intertemporal choices. If the same individual has different incarnations at different dates, then his r 
her intertemporal choices will no longer be consistent, and this has important implications for many 
economic phenomena including savings, incentives, or more generally any transaction or contract 
involving different dates. Under the phenomenon is called hyperbolic discounting, the present is 
more ‘salient’ than the future. For example, I may decide now to save £100 next year, in effect 
exchanging this sum for, say, £110 the following year. But when next year arrives I instead consume 
the £1004. Thus my choices are inconsistent, as if the person who decides next year were a different 
incarnation of myself from the one who decides today.  
A related theme is that preferences are determined by the context in which the choice has to be 
exerted. That is, preferences between two alternative choices may depend on the set of third 
alternatives that are available or on the way the choice problem is formulated, or on both. 
Furthermore, the well-being derived from an action (say, consuming a good) depends on how that 
action fares compared to some reference, that is, to what people expect. That reference is itself 
influenced by the person’s past economic experiences, as well as his or her economic environment. 
For example, numerous empirical studies show that default options matter; that is, more generally, 
the framing of a decision problem - the way it is formulated - affects which decision is actually made, 
for a given set of alternatives.  
An example of the importance of reference points is the endowment effect. This means that 
somebody values a good more if he or she already has it. Thaler (1980) and Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler (1990) have shown, for example, that people value a good more immediately after they have 
acquired it. In an experiment, they randomly distributed mugs that were worth $5 to their subjects, 
and then opened a market for those mugs. On average, those who were given the mugs asked for a 
higher price than those not initially endowed, suggesting that the mere fact of possessing the mugs 
increased the subjects’ utility. 
All these biases imply that there is no longer a presumption that people act in their own best 
interest. Furthermore, if one adopts the view that people are made of multiple selves, the basic 
decision unit is no longer the individual but a smaller unit: the incarnation. Accordingly,  utilitarian 
social welfare should now be defined as the sum of the welfare of all incarnations, rather than 
individuals. This is what I label as post-utilitarianism. Furthermore, according to behavioural 
economics, there is no presumption that different incarnations within the same individual cooperate 
between them, or, if they do, that the resulting allocation of resources is in agreement with that of a 
notional ‘social planner’. For example, this social planner may constrain the choices of your current 
incarnation (say by restricting your alcohol consumption or forcing you to save part of your income) 
in order to increase the welfare of your future incarnation.  
 
                                                          
4 This psychological phenomenon was uncovered by Chung and Herrnstein (1967). It came back into fashion in 
economics in particular with the work of Laibson (1997).  
 
The implications of post-utilitarianism 
 
The transition from utilitarianism to post-utilitarianism eliminates the safeguards against excess 
government intervention that were associated with utilitarianism. The presumption that individual 
choices are irrational implies that no area, including privacy, can be left untouched by government 
intervention. At the same time, public policies and ethics can no longer rely on the notion of 
individual responsibility. Let us discuss these two implications in turn. 
Under traditional utilitarianism, the government does not need to know people’s preferences. It can 
set up a framework which enables mutually profitable transactions to take place, regardless of the 
actual content of those transactions. If it cares about inequality, it can implement in that framework 
a mechanism for redistributing money from rich to poor. But again, once this mechanism is in place it 
does not have to pay attention to how the money is actually spent. Because of the revealed 
preference principle, much choice can be delegated to the individuals and this is why utilitarianism 
leads to a presumption in favour of free markets.  
In the post-utilitarian society, revealed preferences no longer signify. This means that what is good 
for the people must be measured directly, and can then be imposed upon them using a wide variety 
of government interventions, of differing degree of coerciveness. 
This involves, for example: 
1. The introduction of sin taxes on goods that are considered addictive or dangerous for people 
with self-control issues, such as alcohol, tobacco, firearms, gambling, sweets, videogames, 
pornography. There are countless examples of such taxes. 
2. Direct prohibition of transactions based on their agreed price or the nature of the good, on 
the basis that one party cannot possibly rationally benefit from the transaction. For example, 
a French law bans the rental of rooms smaller than nine square meters, despite that nobody 
was ever forced to live in such rooms prior to the law5. (Needless to say, the media 
complained about a shortage of student housing in the following year after). 
3. Manipulating the way choices are presented to use context effects so as to induce people to 
make the ‘right’ choice. Thus post-utilitarians advocate enrolling people into pension funds 
as a default option, or conspicuously presenting healthy foods6.  While this has been labelled 
‘libertarian paternalism’ because it does not reduce the set of available alternatives, it is in 
fact a small tax on the ‘wrong’ choice (because those who want to make that choice must 
devote more time and attention in order to overturn the default option), somewhat similar 
to the Swedish  state monopoly on alcohol sales which artificially increases the distance 
between outlets and reduces their opening hours. In all those examples, we are faced with 
what is in effect an in-kind sin tax rather than a monetary one. 
4. Manipulating beliefs and information so as to induce the correct reaction from the people. 
This could involve overstating risks and consequences in public campaigns against AIDS or 
                                                          
5 It is not difficult to write formal economic models that support such regulations, see for example Akerlof and 
Dickens (1982), Sheshinski (2002), Saint-Paul (2002). 
6 See Thaler and Sunstein (2003). These authors’ popular work Nudge  (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) has 
apparently been an important influence on UK prime minister David Cameron. 
obesity; understating them in order to avoid irrational panic reactions (this what the French 
government did in 1986 when it denied that the Chenobyl cloud went over the country); 
undertaking costly actions to accommodate irrational fears.7 
5. Finally, in a post-utilitarian society there is no presumption of respect for individuals’ 
preferences, since they do not deliver optimal or consistent choices. One can therefore 
envisage training people to be happy, for example by designing school curricula to that 
effect, as  advocated by some authors8. 
 A very important role is ascribed to the ‘experts’ who are in charge of measuring the effects of 
alternative government policies on social welfare. Indeed, as the example at the beginning of this 
article suggests, we are provided with such expert opinion in the media every time a new policy 
aimed at restricting individual freedom is put in place. And that freedom carries no weight in the 
analysis, because the utilitarian and post-utilitarian approaches alike are consequentialist. That is, a 
given policy is evaluated on the basis of its final effect on the material allocation of resources alone, 
irrespective of whether or not the process by which such allocation is attained is acceptable. Once 
the experts9 have provided evidence that the policy improves social welfare, it can be implemented 
without any further discussion. In particular, no attention is paid to the fact that the policy affects 
individuals differently. For example, banning sodas may prevent compulsive drinkers from gaining 
weight, but how about reasonable drinkers who have no particular weight problems, and whose set 
of choices is being coercively restricted? This argument does not matter to the paternalists, not only 
because they are consequentialists, but also because as post-utilitarians, they only care about total 
welfare and disregard individual cases10. As long as we believe that on average the policy works (say 
we have proved that the average weight of New Yorkers will fall if sodas are banned), it will be 
considered as beneficial. This in turn means that it is enough to measure the average effect of the 
policy, and to conduct the whole discussion in terms of averages.  
Yet even from a post-utilitarian perspective, it would seem more efficient to let people without 
weight problems consume what they want, and to impose restrictions on overweight people only. 
For example why not impose higher taxes on them, thus giving them incentives to become slimmer? 
This would presumably be more efficient than a tax or a ban on sodas, since under such a scheme all 
sources of excess weights are taxed equally. One may object that this may run into a concern for 
equality. Maybe, but any crusade against obesity will inevitably impose higher costs on those people 
who are prone to eat more, so one may argue that such policies are inherently inegalitarian. Another 
objection is that this would be unpractical as it would involve obtaining a measure of weight in order 
to determine one’s income tax. However this is no different from many other items involved in a tax 
return, for which tax authorities collect informations on the basis of voluntary reporting subject to 
checks and penalties. The real reason why taxing weight directly is not contemplated, is that the 
post-utilitarian paradigm considers that such incentive schemes, and more generally policies that rely 
on individual responsibility, are inefficient and lack a moral justification. 
It only makes sense to hold individuals responsible for the consequences of their actions if they are 
considered as unitary. If instead we consider them as consisting of multiple selves it follows that the 
                                                          
7 See Salanié and Treich (2007). 
8 See Layard (2007). 
9 Such experts, of course, may themselves be subject to biases though this possibility is frequently ignored. 
10 This is also true, of course, of utilitarianism.  
incarnation that bears the consequences of one action may differ from the one which chose that 
action.  Thus if  individuals suffer from the consequences of their past choices we consider them as  
victims of their past incarnations as if those were  different individuals, who cannot be penalized 
since they no longer exist.  
In a post-utilitarian world it is no longer morally justified to impose negative penalties on people 
because of their past choices. And by the same token, relying on traditional reward and penalty 
structures may be inefficient, as the incentives elicited by these structures are weakened by the fact 
that the incarnation being punished/rewarded will be different from the one undertaking the action. 
Thus, it is difficult to deter Mr Hyde from committing a crime if he believes that Dr Jekyll, rather than 
himself, will suffer from the subsequent sentence.  
From this perspective it is not surprising that our societies increasingly rely on prevention rather than 
penalties. The emphasis on prevention again opens the door for limitless government infringement 
on personal freedoms. In the traditional liberal society, only those actions that directly harm other 
people, such as murder, violence and theft, are supposed to be penalized. In the post-utilitarian 
society, where people are not deemed to be capable of self-control, any action which may initiate a 
chain of events whose final consequences are harmful may be legitimately restricted. Since the 
incarnation, rather than the individual, is now the basic unit of welfare analysis, the logic applies 
regardless of whether the harm being done at the end of the chain of events is to individuals 
themselves or to third parties.  
Thus cigarette candies have been banned in France, because they might induce children to smoke at 
a later age (although neither cigarettes nor candies are banned). New York City’s mayor wants to ban 
supersize soda, because some people may drink too much of it and become overweight. These 
preventing measures are meant to protect people against themselves. Other examples, such as a law 
preventing bartenders in France from serving alcohol to clients who may be intoxicated, against the 
client’s will and against their own commercial interest, are supposed to prevent harms to third 
parties, for example in a road accident.  
At the same time that more preventive measures are being introduced, and for the same reason, we 
see more reluctance to let people bear the consequences of their own choices. This explains why we 
see unconditional social assistance coupled with compulsory contributions to pension systems; free 
medical treatment for diseases caused by lifestyles coupled with  taxes on tobacco, Scotland’s 
minimum prices for alcohol and Denmark’s tax on foods containing saturated fat; free availability of 
methadone and needles to addicts, while consumption is illegal for non-addicts. 
But replacing repression with prevention involves a contradiction. In order to enforce prevention, the 
government must pass new laws that make some previously legal actions now illegal. But to enforce 
those laws it must implement sanctions for those who break them. Therefore we cannot do away 
with repression. But, if the preventive law was passed on the grounds that repression does not work, 
how can that law be enforced? The answer to this contradiction is to selectively apply repressive 
tools to responsible individuals and organizations alone. Furthermore, it is also efficient for a post-
utilitarian state to endow these responsible entities with the task of enforcing preventive measures 
to constrain the behaviour of irresponsible people, whenever that is feasible. Thus, in the above 
example, the irresponsible drinker cannot be trusted and the bartender is asked to internalize social 
welfare by refusing to serve his or her client. This is the phenomenon of responsibility transfer.  
In some sense, responsibility transfer is a new socialism of rationality. As in a Marxist society where 
one gives to each according to his needs and asks from each according to his abilities, in a world 
where responsibility transfer is pervasive, those who are considered to be rational bear the burden 
of responsibility. Incentives and penalties only apply to them, while the others are treated as legal 
and moral minors. As in the bartender and other examples, penalties for their harmful actions are 
transferred to the responsible caste to the extent that their interactions with them can be considered 
as a cause of the harmful action. And, as in a Marxist society where there is no incentive to create 
wealth, perverse effects arise. People may voluntarily put themselves in situations where they are 
exempted from individual responsibility, while the responsible ones may refrain from interacting 
with the irresponsible caste11. 
Another area open to greater regulation because of paternalistic concerns is that of markets. 
Markets are the enemy of paternalists for at least three reasons. First, there is no longer a 
presumption that they will clear efficiently, because the agents who perform arbitrage are no longer 
seen to do so rationally, but are instead influenced by behavioural biases such as overconfidence or 
compulsive trading. Therefore, there is no longer a presumption that markets deliver the correct 
price. Second, sellers may exploit the buyers’ biases, for example by using teaser rates or various 
forms of manipulative advertising, in order to induce them to make purchases against their own 
interest. Third, markets may allow people to undo the paternalistic policies that are imposed upon 
them. Banning supersize sodas will have no effect if one can buy two regular sodas instead. 
Compulsory savings schemes can be undone by borrowing against the future returns from such 
schemes. Being banned from casinos, even voluntarily, cannot be enforced if new casinos constantly 
enter the market or if online betting sites proliferate.  
 
Conclusion 
 
For those of us who believe that individual freedom and limited government are important 
cornerstones of our society, is there some way one can resist the rise of the paternalistic state? 
It would be tempting to restore the old utilitarian foundations for limited government by denying the 
relevance of behavioural biases. Yet these biases are well documented by recent research, and if 
anything the attacks against individual freedom that we observe tell us how shaky these utilitarian 
foundations really were12.  
Surely the reason why we care about individual rights goes beyond the hypothesis that they are an 
efficient tool to decentralize the allocation of resources? It is therefore necessary to move beyond 
utilitarianism and restore individual autonomy, freedom and responsibility as core values of our 
society, and accordingly define strict limits on the scope of government interventions. This involves 
                                                          
11 There are countless examples of regulations that backlash against the very people they are supposed to 
protect. For example, in France, it is very difficult to expel a tenant for nonpayment of the rent if he or she is 
unemployed or old. As a result, elderly people or people with precarious jobs have considerable difficulties 
renting a home.   
12 Note however that post-utilitarian arguments against paternalism can be made, by noting that politicians 
and bureaucrats themselves are prone to behavioural biases. See Glaeser (2005). 
living with the consequences and getting rid of the idea that the government is a benevolent tutor in 
charge of general happiness. At present, unfortunately, few forces seem to oppose the rise of 
paternalism. 
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